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The aim of this paper is to measure the extent to which lower wages in R&D functions reflect 
a preference effect. In contrast to the bulk of the literature on compensating wage 
differentials that compares wage levels of jobs with different attributes, we constructed 
measures of willingness to accept (WTA) and pay (WTP) for an R&D jobs using contingent 
valuation technique. Earnings regressions using OLS show an R&D wage penalty of about 
3.5%. However, hedonic OLS regressions of WTA and WTP give significant relative 
preference parameters for R&D jobs that range from 0.19 to 0.22. 
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Although it has long been recognized that agreeable and disagreeable job
characteristics should be re
ected in wages, empirical evidence on this issue
is scarce and concentrates mainly on compensation for risks, stress, noise and
bad working conditions. Recently, several papers have started documenting
compensations for specic types of jobs. Krueger and Schkade (2007) con-
centrate on the compensations for social interaction on the job and Stern
(2004) on compensation for doing scientic research.
In this paper we consider the preferences of scientists and engineers for
R&D functions. Scientists and engineers working in R&D functions in gen-
eral earn less than scientists and engineers working in other technical and
management occupations (e.g. Lassibille, 2001). Shortages of R&D workers
are often attributed to low wages in R&D functions (e.g. Marey, 2002) but if
these low wages re
ects preferences, wage policies will not be very ecient in
increasing the number of R&D workers. The aim of this paper is to measure
the extent to which lower wages in R&D functions re
ect a preference eect.
In most of the literature compensating wage dierentials (CWDs) are
estimated by comparing wage levels of jobs with dierent attributes. The
main problem with this approach is that more able workers, or workers with
higher earnings capacity in general, command jobs with more agreeable non-
nancial attributes. The omitted variable bias created by unobserved het-
erogeneity, therefore, leads to underestimation of CWDs (e.g. Brown, 1980).
In attempts to account for this problem, studies in the related literature (see
Lassibille (2001) for instance) have used instrumental variable techniques
or self-selection methods like Heckman's two step procedure or switching
regression models. However, as Epple (1987) and Kahn and Lang (1988)
already argued, because in equilibrium workers characteristics (observed and
unobserved) are mapped onto jobs characteristics (observed and unobserved),
there exist no valid (external) instruments or exclusion restrictions for either
sets of characteristics, at least in a single cross-section. This means that, in
a single cross-section, IV methods cannot be used to estimate consistently
workers and/or rms preference parameters from data on wages. Similarly,
identication in self-selection models will rely merely on the nonlinearity of
hazard rates since exclusion restrictions are ruled out by the mapping of
workers characteristics on jobs characteristics.
In this paper, we circumvent this problem of eliciting preferences from
wage data by eliciting workers' willingness to accept (WTA) and pay (WTP)
for an R&D job directly from survey questions. Workers' WTA/P are mea-
sured through Contingent Valuation method conducted in a survey among
Dutch scientists and engineers containing information, among other, on work-
2ers' wages and job types. The Contingent Valuation method gives us a direct
measure of a person's preference for R&D jobs which allows us to directly
estimate R&D preference parameters by regressing workers' WTA and WTP
on workers' characteristics.
Earnings regressions using OLS show a wage penalty for R&D workers
of 3.5%. However, our measures of WTA indicates that the willingness of
scientists and engineers working in R&D functions to accept a job in a non-
R &D function is 15% of their current wage, in contrast to scientists and
engineers working in non-R &D functions whose willingness to accept an
R&D function is 7% of their current wage. Similarly, our measure of WTP
indicates that the willingness of scientists and engineers working in R&D
functions to pay in order to hold an R&D function is 11% of their wage
which contrasts with the willingness of scientists and engineers working in
non-R &D functions to pay for a non-R &D function of 8%. Using OLS
we nd signicant estimates of the preference parameter towards R&D jobs
relative to non-R &D jobs. Our estimate points range between 0:19 log points
and 0:22 log points.
This paper is related to Stern (2004). Stern (2004) circumvented the
sorting issue in the context of R&D compensation by comparing multiple job
oers for PhD biologists. He found large compensating wage dierentials for
science orientated jobs, i.e. scientist are prepared to accept a wage reduction
of 19% for a job in which they can freely publish their research results in
external journals. Note that while we are concerned by the extensive margin
of the problem, that is the question of whether to choose an R&D job or
not, Stern's (2004) results refer to the intensive margin by looking at the
compensation required to being able to freely publish conditional on have
chosen an R&D job. While Stern's approach provides consistent estimates of
the CWD and has the advantage to be based on real transactions as opposed
to our approach that is based on answers to hypothetical questions, Stern's
data are rare and extremely costly to produce whereas our method could be
implemented in any survey at very low costs.
2 Methodology
Suppose that the utility of a worker with characteristics x is uRD(wRD;x) if
she works in an R&D job and uNRD(wNRD;x) otherwise where:
uj(wj;x) = hj(wj)   fj(x)
3wj is the worker's wage1 at job j and fj(x) her disutility of working at
job j. Assuming that hj(wj) = lnwj the worker is indierent between R&D
and non-R&D jobs if:
uNRD(wNRD;x) = uRD(wRD;x)
,
lnwNRD   lnwRD = fRD(x)   fNRD(x) (1)
The left hand side of the equation corresponds to worker's CWD for not
working in an R&D job. If CWD > 0, the worker has a preference for
R&D relative to non-R&D jobs. Without information on the CWD it is not
straightforward to estimate the preference function fRD(x)   fNRD(x). In
general we will observe either wRD or wNRD of each worker. The coecient
of an R&D dummy in an OLS regression of (log) wages will not identify the
preference parameters because in equilibrium workers characteristics will be
mapped onto job characteristics, at least in a single cross section. To see
this consider an economy with two types of jobs, R&D and non-R &D. This
economy has 10 workers who dier in terms of a vector of characteristics x.
These characteristics are determinants of a worker's preference towards R&D
jobs. Suppose that, for each worker, the minimum wage dierence between
non-R&D and R&D jobs, for which she would be willing to work in an R&D
job is known and given by CWD = CWD(x). The higher the CWD, the
higher the preference for R&D jobs. We could rank workers by decreasing
CWD (decreasing preference for R&D jobs) and plot CWD on the rank (see
Table 1). Assuming full employment, that is assuming that CWD is larger
than the reservation wage for each worker, the equilibrium wage premium
given the demand for R&D workers could be directly inferred by inspection
of this graph. If there were N R&D jobs in the economy, the wage premium
necessary to induce the Nth worker to work in an R&D job is  CWD of the
worker ranked Nth.
As a consequence, unless workers are homogenous in terms of their pref-
erence towards R&D jobs, i.e. CWD(x) = CWD(x0) for all x and x0, the
mean wage of R&D workers relative to the mean wage of non-R &D workers
conditional on x  to control for the direct eect x might have on wages 
will depend on the demand for R&D workers. To see this, suppose that there
are 4 R&D jobs in the economy. The OLS estimate of the R&D dummy will
be -2.2, i.e. minus the CWD of the fourth worker. Consider now the same
1The wage could depend on x as well as on additional characteristics y that are unre-
lated to preferences for R&D and written as wj(x;y) without changing the main structure
of the model.
4economy but with 8 R&D jobs. The OLS estimate of the R&D dummy is
equal to 4:2, which is equal to minus the CWD of the ninth worker. In the
rst case we would conclude that there is a relative preference for R&D jobs,
in the second case that there is a relative preference for non-R&D while the
structure of preferences is clearly the same in both cases.
This simple example illustrates the idea that the coecient of an R&D
dummy in an OLS regression of (log) wages on workers and rms character-
istics will not identify preference parameters and hence will not allow one
to trace out the function CWD(x) unless all characteristics that matter in
determining a worker's CWD are observed. This is a very strong assump-
tion that is most unlikely to be met in any dataset. The sign of the bias will
tend to be negative as those that select into R&D occupations tend to have
characteristics that lowers their WTA and therefore will command a lower
compensation.
Confronted with an omitted variable problem, the econometrician might
screen the data for a valid instrument for RD and use instrumental variable
techniques or control function models of the Heckman type or switching re-
gression models to estimate the coecient of the R&D-dummy consistently.
However, the problem at hand, unlike the traditional omitted variable bias
problem, is more severe. Usual instruments for R&D from the other side
of the market, i.e. variables containing information about employers or jobs
in our case, are ruled out by the mapping of workers characteristics onto
jobs characteristics in equilibrium, at least in a single cross-section.2 Even
if workers do not care about certain characteristics of their employers, these
employers characteristics are likely to be determinants of whether an em-
ployer oers an R&D job or not. The equilibrium mapping therefore rules
out the use of IV methods in single cross-section and that identication in
the selection models hinges on the nonlinearity of the control function. For
that reason we tried to obtain direct measures of the worker's CWD for
an R&D Job. These measures can be used to estimate directly equation
1. Note that this equation corresponds to the well-known second stage of
Rosen's procedure to estimate the preference parameters when job charac-
teristics are continuous variables(see Rosen (1974)). Assuming that i) fj(x)
is additive separable in the observed and unobserved characteristics x, i.e.
2In footnote 5 page 119, refering to this problem, Brown (1980) stated that:
[...nding instruments for Z (read RD in our case) that are not themselves
X's (read x) would be extremely dicult]
In fact, as pointed out earlier in the hedonic price literature by Bartik (1987b), Epple
(1987) and Kahn and Lang (1988), it is impossible if workers characteristics are mapped
on employers characteristics
5fj(x) = gj(xo) + hj(xu) and proxying gj by polynomial form of order 2, i.e.
gj(x) = j +Xj, ii) hj(xu) is multivariate normal with a covariance matrix
that accounts for the cross alternative dependence and allows unobserved
heterogeneity across individuals and iii) hj(xu) is uncorrelated with gj(xo)
we estimate:
CWD =  + 
RD + X + e (2)
where e = hRD(xu)   hNRD(xu) and X stands for a vector of variables that
are transformations of xo, i.e. squared x or interaction across xo's.
Note that the inclusion of the R&D dummy in this regression only aims
at picking up unobserved preference dierences between R&D workers and
non R&D workers. Ideally, we would have a rich enough set of variables in
our data to explain preferences so that our estimate of 
 will tend to 0. If
not, 
 will give us the magnitude of the willingness of scientists and engineers
working in R&D functions to accept a job in a non-R &D function conditional
on X.
3 Data
The data used for our analysis was collected by means of an internet sur-
vey among Dutch Scientists and Engineers with a bachelor or master degree.
All members of the Royal Institution of Engineers in the Netherlands (KIVI
NIRIA)3 plus the subscribers of the weekly professional journal for scientists
and engineers (Technisch Weekblad) were approached by e-mail to partici-
pate in the survey.4 KIVI NIRIA members were approached by an e-mail
from (the director of) KIVI NIRIA in which the aim of the survey was ex-
plained and a link to the survey was provided. Furthermore the survey was
announced in the weekly newsletter and subscribers of Technisch Weekblad
were approached by an e-mail on behalf of the editor. The survey was also
announced in the journal. Our sample contains therefore those engineers and
3KIVI NIRIA is a professional organization that look after the interests of Dutch sci-
entists and engineers and provide services that assist members with the development of
their professional careers, for example individual advices on salary negotiations. Individual
members get advice on (individual) salary negotiations.
4Since graduates from natural sciences disciplines at non-technical universities (math-
ematics, physics etc.) do not have the title Ingenieur (Ir) they are generally not members
of Kivi Niria (although they may be subscribers of Technisch Weekblad) and will gener-
ally not be in the data. We do not think that this will be a problem as we may argue
that preferences for R&D and non-R&D functions are the same for mathematicians from
technical and non-technical universities.
6scientists graduates who opted for a technical career and subsequently faced
a choice between an R&D jobs or a non-R &D job.
As monetary incentives, 20 gift certicates of 50 euro were put on for rae
between the respondents and all respondents were told that upon completion
of the questionnaire, they would be oered a free subscription to Technisch
Weekblad and C2W, a professional journal about chemistry, life sciences
and process technology. The response rate was about 20%. About 6000
respondents started the interview. About one third of the respondents had
not graduated yet or where already retired leaving about 4,396 individuals
eligible for our study. After deleting individuals with missing values for the
main variables of interest (job and wage) and selecting only those with a
monthly wage larger than 1000 euros, working between 24 and 60 hours a
week and aged under 66, 3,590 observations remained.
The survey included questions about the eld of study, year of graduating,
type of function, eld of function, employer (number of employees, sector
of industry) and earnings. Scientists and engineers in the Netherlands are
employed in very dierent (technical) functions and only 18% are employed
in an R&D function. The probability of being employed in an R&D job
decreasing with age from about 25% at age 25 to about 10% at age 65.
Descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest are reported in Table
2.
We approach the worker's CWD by the willingness to pay for an R&D
job (WTP) and the willingness to accept an R&D job (WTA).The WTA is
the compensation a worker holding an R&D job demands for switching to
a non-R&D job. The WTP is the wage cut a worker holding an non-R&D
job is prepared to take to obtain an R&D job. Theoretically we should have
CWD = WTA = WTP but it is known from the literature that in general
WTA > WTP (see Horowitz and McConell (2002). People demand a higher
compensation for the loss of a good than the amount they are prepared to
pay to obtain that good. Therefore the WTP is the lower limit for the CWD
and the WTA the upper limit. To measure a worker's WTA and WTP,
we followed the Contingent Valuation literature (see Hanemann (1994) for
instance) and included the following two questions to the survey.
1. Individuals working in an R&D/non-R&D function were asked: `At
the moment you are working in a [eld of function] function. Suppose
you were oered [a non-R&D function in the following eld: (random
selection of: construction/design, production, management, counseling,
planning/coordination, quality control, education)]/[R&D function] in
the same region and under the same conditions (hours per week, non-
pecuniary benets) as your current function. What is the minimum
7salary that should be oered for you to accept the function?'
2. Furthermore we asked what wage sacrice, i.e. willingness to pay, in-
dividuals were prepared to make in order to keep their oer: `Imagine
that your department or organization will be reorganized and part of
the R&D positions/current position for non-R&D functions will dis-
appear. Employees in this position get the choice between a dierent
function in the eld of [random selection of: construction/design, pro-
duction, management, counseling, planning/coordination, quality, con-
trol, education for R&D function/ R&D function for workers working
in non-R&D function] at their current salary or their current position
at a lower salary. All other conditions remain the same for both func-
tions. What is the lowest monthly gross earnings for which you should
choose to work in your own function?'
Question 1 provides a measure of the WTA en question 2 a measure of the
WTP. Taking the log of the answer to Question 1, lnAns1, and subtracting
the log of the current wage gives us a measure of the WTA an R&D job
for those whose current job is R&D, i.e. lnAns1   lnw. The WTA a non-
R&D job for those whose current job is non-R&D, lnAns1  lnw. Assuming
symmetry, that is assuming that the WTA an R&D job for workers whose
current job is non-R&D were they employed in an R&D job is equal to
 (lnw   lnAns1), we dene our measure of WTA an R&D job as:
WTA =

lnw   lnAns1 if RD = 0
lnAns1   lnw if RD = 1
where RD is a dummy that takes for value 1 if the worker's current job is
R&D and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, taking the log of the answer to Question 2, lnAns2, and sub-
tracting this amount to the log of the current wage gives us a measure of
the WTP to hold an R&D job for those whose current job is R&D, i.e.
lnw lnAns2 and the WTP to hold a non-R &D job for those whose current
job is non-R &D, lnw lnAns2. Assuming symmetry, that is assuming that
the WTP to hold an R&D job for workers whose current job is non-R &D
were they employed in an R&D job is equal to  (lnw   lnAns2), we dene
our measure of WTP an R&D job as:
WTP =

lnAns2   lnw if RD = 0
lnw   lnAns2 if RD = 1
8Unfortunately, from the 3,590 respondents for which complete informa-
tion about their job, wage and demographics is available, roughly 740 did
not answer question 1 or question 2. One reason for that may have been that
the questions were at the end of the questionnaire.5 However, fortunately
enough, the probability of not answering question 1 or 2 is not signicantly
related to observable characteristics like wage, hours work, function or elds
of education and only appears to be larger for those with more experience.
From the 2,850 that answered either question 1 or 2, roughly a fth answered
\I don't know". The probability of answering \I don't know" to question 1
or 2 is not signicantly related to observable characteristics like wage, hours
work, job type or elds of education and only appears to be larger for those
with more experience and no permanent contract. After trimming for ex-
treme values dened as more than twice or less than half the current wage,
our sample contains complete information, including WTA and WTP, for
1,969 respondents. Note that the distribution of workers to types of jobs is
preserved as 374 or 19% of those answering both questions have an R&D job
compared to 646 or 18% of the full sample.
Carson et al. (1996) have shown that when it is possible to compare CV
measures with other measures using real transactions like hedonic prices, the
results are often fairly close, with the CV measure being usually slightly lower
than the revealed preference estimate but both being highly correlated with
a range of correlations between 0.78 to 0.92. Despite this empirical evidence,
the main criticism about the use of WTA and WTP is that the question
asked to elicit WTA/P may appear to be a silly one to the respondents or
the respondent's answer to the question may just be the result of picking a
number. These critics refer to the credibility and reliability of the question
used to elicit WTA/P (see Diamond and Hausman (1994)). Credibility refers
to the extent to which the respondents answer the question asked by the
interviewer. Reliability refers to the size and direction of the bias in the
respondent's answer.6
5The last question of the survey was an open question about the respondents opinion
about the questionnaire. Those that answered the question complained about the length
of the questionnaire and especially the section on measuring competencies included in it
and appearing right before question 1 and 2 above. However, none did complain about
question 1 and 2.
6A third point of concern is the precision of the measurement. This refers to the
variability in the responses and is most relevant for small sample size surveys. Given the
rather large size of our sample, the precision problem could be dismissed without further
arguments.
An example of the incredibility of WTA/P measures often cited is summarized in the
following question: How meaningful is the answer of randomly chosen persons in a shop-
ping Mall about their willingness to pay for preserving the environment. As Hanemann
9The most important factor for the credibility of WTA/P lies in the way
these values are elicited, i.e. credibility is embedded in the question itself.
For WTA/P to be credible, the question should be specic and realistic to
the persons interviewed. We argue that the two questions posed in the survey
used for this study are both very specic and very realistic for the respon-
dents since the questions refer to situations that the respondents have been
confronted with in the course of their career. Graduating from a technical
university, the scientists and engineers interviewed have entered the labor
market and considered the type of jobs they would prefer. Doing research
or not? has probably been the most important question they had to answer
in their career. They also have been confronted with the market and had
to choose between applying for jobs with higher potential earnings but no
research or lower potential earnings but including room for doing research.
Furthermore, engineers and scientists continue to be confronted with this
question, like other employees, as they may still decide to switch jobs if the
gap between their job and the market wage for R&D increases (decreases).
Hanemann (1994) argues that closed-ended questions should be preferred
to open-ended question. The main argument behind this choice is that people
tend to have diculties in putting a price behind their preferences. Suggest-
ing a price and asking if they would accept or pay at that price and random-
izing the amount proposed to the various respondent should overcome this
issue. However, this argument holds for valuing the WTA/P of products for
which prices are posted and hence people do not bargain. In our case, peo-
ple were asked about their (virtual) wage (monthly or yearly). Since wages
are not posted7 but bargained at the hiring moment, it seems reasonable to
expect that open-ended and closed-ended questions would deliver merely the
same answer. The main advantage of open question for our study is that
they allow us to directly measure WTA and WTP instead of using the share
of workers accepting an R&D job.
(1994) argued, this way of eliciting WTA/P is of course not credible even for the strongest
supports of the Contingent Valuation technique and does certainly not correspond to the
methodology used by careful practitioners. Hanemann (1994) provided several directions
to follow in order to increase the credibility of CV. For instance, the survey should follow
the rules of probability sampling as opposed to convenient sampling in the shopping Mall
or consists of in-person interview as opposed to self-administered surveys for they allow
the interviewer to control the process. He also recognized that since in-person interviews
are much more expensive, they would lead to an inevitable reduction of the sample size
and hence in the precision of the measurement.
7Sometimes ranges of wages are posted on job oers but the actual wage still remains
to be bargained about.
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4.1 Preliminary results
First of all, we run a simple earnings regression. Corrected for observable
characteristics, R&D workers earn 3.5% less than non-R&D workers (Table
3). Earnings regressions on the restricted and full samples show very similar
results suggesting that the restricted sample is not very selective with respect
to earnings and R&D preferences. As we will see below the wage penalty for
doing R&D greatly underestimates the CWD for R&D.
We have also estimated the parameters of the wage regression using con-
trol function techniques. The technique consists of two steps. In the rst
step, we ran a regression of R&D on the set of explanatory variables included
in the OLS wage regression above (without excluded variables since, as ar-
gued in section 2, there are no valid instruments in a single cross-section).
We then used probit techniques and calculated the value of the control func-
tion for the linear tted values. In the second step, we included the control
function as an additional regressor in the OLS wage regression. Identication
requires the control function to be nonlinear when no exclusion restrictions
exist. In our data, although a quadratic t of the control function is signif-
icantly better, the R2 of the linear t is equal to 0.90 indicating that the
linear t already explains 90% of the variance. More important, the R2 of a
regression of the control function on the other explanatory variables is about
0.93 indicating strong multicollinearity in the wage regression. Finally, the
coecient of the control function is equal to 0:08 and is not signicant and
the coecient of R&D remains stable at  3:5%. These results cast some
doubts on the identication of the model.
Now we turn to the WTA/WTP measures. Table 4 gives the WTA/WTP
measures for R&D and non-R&D workers. For R&D workers the mean WTA
is 0.15 log points. The WTA of non-R&D workers ranges from -0.05 log points
for workers employed in management functions to -0.09 for workers employed
in communication functions. The mean WTP for R&D workers is 0.11 log
points. As expected the mean WTP for R&D workers is below the mean
WTA but the dierence is small. The WTP for non-R&D workers ranges
from -0.06 log points for workers employed in education to -0.10 log points for
workers employed in management functions. We have randomized the type
of job proposed to R&D workers as their alternative job but interestingly
enough, we found no dierences in the distribution of WTA and WTP by
type of function except for the WTA in \Education" function included in
the \other" function which is found to be lower than the WTA in all other
functions (Table 5).
11The mean and median of the dierence between our WTA and WTP
measures are very close to 0 and the interquartile is around 25 percent points
as indicated in Table 6. To summarize, our measures of WTP and WTA
appear to be quite robust across functions and the WTP seem to be slightly
more stable than the WTA.
4.2 Main results
Table 7 gives the results of the WTA/WTP regressions. The OLS estimates
of the R&D coecient in the WTA equations shows that the minimum wages
for which R&D workers are willing to accept an R&D job are 22% lower than
that of non-R&D workers. It is to be expected that the WTA increases with
age, experience and tenure as older and more experienced workers with long
tenure are more likely to have recognized a good job match and will therefore
be more reluctant to switch jobs. Surprisingly this seems not to be the case.
Other observable individual and job characteristics such as hours worked,
gender and sector of industry do not impact on WTA and WTP either.
The WTP estimate gives a relative preference parameter of 0.19 log points,
showing that R&D workers are prepared to pay 19% more than non-R&D
workers to continue working in an R&D job. Except for the type of contract,
observable individual and job characteristics do not have a signicant impact
on the WTP. Workers with a permanent contract are less prepared to pay
for an R&D job than workers with a temporary contract.
To see whether we can relate R&D preferences to other worker character-
istics we included workers' valuations of job characteristics in the WTA/WTP
regressions. Workers were asked to rate on a 5 point likert scale how much
value they attached to certain job characteristics (1=not at all important,
... 5=very important) such as work autonomy, salary, job certainty etc. It is
found that the more value workers attach to work autonomy, a high salary
and the possibility to combine work and family roles the lower the WTA for
R&D. Workers who think it is important to be able to learn new things at
work have a higher WTA. Surprisingly, workers who attach much value to a
high salary have a small but signicant higher WTP. Finally we included a
dummy variable for workers who were searching for another job at the time
of the survey. Workers who were searching for another job have a lower WTA
and a lower WTP. Although some of the job characteristics valuations and
the job search dummy have a signicant impact on the WTA/WTP they
explain very little of the variance.
125 Robustness check
Note that the assumption of symmetry between workers employed in R&D
and workers employed in non-R&D functions may lead to overestimation of
the preference eect if workers are reluctant to switch jobs for reasons that
have nothing to do with the type of their current job. For example because
job switching involves switching costs. Although the respondents were told
that the alternative job was in the same region under the same non-pecuniary
conditions we cannot completely rule out switching costs due to other rea-
sons. Due to the symmetry assumption switching costs will work in dierent
directions for R&D and non-R&D workers in which case the R&D coecient
in the WTA/WTP regressions will be overestimated. Note however, that our
WTA/WTP regressions control for age (experience), job tenure, permanent
contract, variables also entering the switching costs function. Furthermore
including the searching for a job dummy does not aect the coecients for
R&D when entered into the regression. This provides strong evidence against
bias in our measures. Nevertheless we will also consider an alternative mea-
sure for WTA/WTP which does not depend on the symmetry assumption.
This alternative measure combines both questions. The WTA for R&D work-
ers is given by the answer to question 2, while the WTA for non-R&D workers
is given by the answer to question 1. Similarly the answer to question 1 pro-
vides a measure of the WTP for R&D workers and the answer to question 2
a measure of the WTP of non-R&D workers.
WTA =

lnw   lnAns1 if RD = 0
lnw   lnAns2 if RD = 1
WTP =

lnw   lnAns2 if RD = 0
lnw   lnAns1 if RD = 1
An advantage of this measure of the WTP/WTA is that possible switching
costs, provided that they have the same size for R&D and non-R&D workers,
are canceled out in the WTA/WTP regressions, because they work in the
same direction for R&D and non-R&D workers. A disadvantage of mixing the
two questions is that the answers will typically depend on the exact phrasing
of the question. Part of the dierence between R&D and non-R&D workers
found by using this measure may be a result of using dierent questions for
both groups. However, it was found that the mean dierence between WTA
and WTP measures when using the same questions for both groups was close
to zero, suggesting that
jlnw   lnAns1j  jlnw   lnAns2j
13So it is to be expected that the eect of mixing two questions to measure
WTA/WTP will be negligible.
Table 8 gives the results of the OLS regressions with the alternative mea-
sures of WTA/WTP. Again the R&D preference parameter is considerable,
ranging from 0.18 log point for the WTA to 0.23 log point for the WTP.
These results show that the estimated preference eect is quite robust for
the WTA/WTP measures chosen.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that traditional measures of R&D compensating wage
dierentials by earnings regressions are severely biased downwards. In equi-
librium workers are sorted into jobs on both worker and job characteristics.
For that reason there exists no valid instrument in a single cross section for
either job characteristics or worker characteristics. Identication in control
function models therefore hinges on the nonlinearity of the control function.
In our data, a linear t of the control function explains 90% of the variation
and more important, the control function appears to be extremely correlated
with the explanatory variables included in the wage regression. To circum-
vent the sorting issue we propose direct measures of the willingness to pay
and the willing to accept an R&D function. We asked R&D (non-R&D) work-
ers for what salary they would be prepared to switch to non-R&D (R&D)
jobs and what salary they were prepared to accept in order to keep their
current job. Using these direct measures of the willingness to accept and the
willingness to pay for an R&D job we show that the relative wage reduction
accepted by the average R&D worker ranges from 19% to 22%. The policy
implication of these ndings is that wage policies will be very inecient in
increasing the number of R&D workers. Relatively low wages in R&D do not
hinder the retention of R&D workers as for this group low wages are com-
pensated by other aspects of R&D work. However, to persuade non-R&D
workers to switch to R&D jobs, wages in R&D should increase enormously.
A more promising line would be to in
uence workers' preferences for R&D
jobs. However, the dierences between R&D and non-R&D workers cannot
be explained by any observable job or individual characteristics such as age,
experience, tenure or sector of industry. We also tested whether observable
preferences such as a preference for work autonomy, salary, job certainty and
interesting work have any impact on the WTA and WTP measures. Although
observable preferences do indeed have some impact on WTA and WTP, this
impact is relatively small and cannot explain the dierences between R&D
and non-R&D workers. To in
uence workers preferences we need a better
14understanding of the factors that in
uence preferences for R&D and non-
R&D jobs. That remains an issue for further research.
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